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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This appeal by Applicant-Appellant Norman J. Mayhew is
from an Order of the Industrial Commission, State of Utah,
dated March 7, 1989.

This Court has jurisdiction over this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-86 and
Section 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION
This appeal by Applicant-Appellant Norman J. Mayhew is
from an Order of the Industrial Commission denying workers
compensation
suffered

benefits

to

Norman

from pre-existing

J. Mayhew, a worker who

headaches, for recurring

head-

aches induced by an incident arising out of his employment.
-3-

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The

issues

Industrial

involve

Commissiony

the
729

application

P. 2d

15

of the Allen v.

(Utah, 1986) case in

which the Supreme Court set forth two pre-requisites for a
finding

of

a compensable

industrial

injury

(accident and

causation) by establishing a two part test, requiring proof
of legal and medical causation, for determining the ultimate
element of. causation.

The issues are:

(1) whether there is

evidence to support the finding of the Industrial Commission
that

the

incident

occasioned

involving Mr. Mayhew on March 12, 1987

any stress or exertion greater than that under-

taken in normal everyday life, applying an objective standard to compare usual and unusual stress or exertion; and
whether the record is sufficient to show a lack of a medically demonstrable link between the incident of March 12, 1987
and the resulting injury.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, and cases interpreting the section are determinative of the issues raised.
Section

35-1-45

is

set

forth

verbatim

in

the

addendum

hereto.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Action
This case involves the denial of workers compen-

sation benefits to Norman J. Mayhew based upon a headache
-4-

developed

while

appraisal

review

engaged

in

a discussion

form

which

headache

of

a personnel

and

pre-existing

conditions resulted in permanent and total disability to Mr.
Mayhew.

Mr. Mayhew

has a history of headaches and other

emotional problems dating back more than 18 months prior to
the incident of March

12, 1987.

The dispute before the

Court of Appeals is whether there is insufficient proof of
either legal causation or medical causation as found by the
administrative

law

judge

and

affirmed

by

the

Industrial

Commission to support an award of workers compensation.
B.

Course of Proceedings - Disposition Below
On June 2, 1987, Mr. Mayhew filed an Application

for Hearing

alleging

"Harassment by Gordon

Shrock, J. 0.

Mack & Dave Brown caused extreme head pain, clinic ice packing,

transportation

to

Ogden

Clinic."

answered denying any liability (R13).
a ten page clarification
claim (R14).

(R9).

Respondent

Mr. Mayhew then filed

letter attempting to explain the

On July 12, 1988, another Application for Hear-

ing was filed prepared by counsel Gale Lemmon to which Defendants again denied liability (R31).
Following

the hearing

of October 14, 1988, the

Administrative Law Judge entered his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying Mr. Mayhew1s claim for
workers

compensation

October 21, 1988.

benefits

(R316).

The

order

issued

Mr. Lemmon was discharged as counsel by
-5-

Mr, Mayhew on November 8f 1988.

On November 21, 1988 Mr.

Mayhew filed a "Motion to Review Findings of Fact, Production of Documents, Supporting Evidence and New Evidence Not
Introduced

in the Hearing."

Mr. Mayhew included 106 pages

of attachments and exhibits (R336-442) .
receive

any portion

Respondent did not

of the above Motion

either

from Mr.

Mayhew or the Industrial Commission.
The

Industrial Commission

of Utah unanimously

issued

its Order Denying Motion for Review on the 7th day of March,
1989 (R443).
Mr. Mayhew, pro se, filed a Petition for Writ of Review
directed

to the Respondent who is listed as the Board of

Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah.

This agency -

Department of Employment Security - is a separate and distinct agency of the Industrial Commission wholly unrelated
to the Workers Compensation Division (R447).

Respondent did

not receive a copy of this motion or the attachments.

Mr.

Mayhew filed a Docketing Statement on May 3f 1989 consisting
of 71 pages (R462-533).

Respondent did not receive a copy

of the Docketing Statement.

A Motion to Reverse Lower Court

Decision was filed May 3, 1989 (R530).

A Court of Appeals

Order issued waiving the filing fee (R535).
not

receive

either

the

Motion

Respondent did

or the Order.

Respondent

first became aware of this appeal on approximately May 20,

-6-

1989 when contacted by the court reporter

inquiring about

the purchase of a transcript.
C.

Statement of the Facts
The Appellant was hired by Respondent originally

in 1966, was terminated
never

terminated

by

in 1976, rehired

Respondent

(R40).

in 1981 and was
Appellant

was

a

quality control engineer on the date of the incident and had
been for over three years (R42).
Appellant's

workers

compensation

claim

had

its

origin in a meeting called at the request of management to
discuss his personnal appraisal review form with his supervisors (R43, 44f 128-134, 148-151).
by Mr. Schrock

for March

The meeting was called

12, 1987 and 1:30 p.m. (R148) .

Appellant, Mr. Brown, Mr. Schrock and Mr. Mack were present.
The

latter

employer

were

supervisors

(R128 et seq.).

or

administrators

of

the

In the evaluation, the appellant

was informed that he would need improvement in the area of
communicating the technical information required as part of
his job and that his overall rating was competent (R132).
Appellant took exception to the evaluation.
of discussion, Brown

relates "It seemed

In the course

like he was just

starting to get his point across when he kind of tossed his
arms up in the air and said 'what's the use1 and walked out
the door (R129).
considerably

but

Mr. Mayhew's version of the event varies
only

in
-7-

detail

(R43-45).

Appellant

characterized the meeting as a refusal to discuss the evaluation and testified

". • . and everything that I requested

was refused and they refused any comment, refused to change
anything, refused

to give any essay on anything.

just complete refusal.
severe —

As this went on, I suffered a very

it's the type of headache like a nerve in the

tooth or eating ice cream too fast.

And it was a pain that

brought tears to my eyes." (R45,46).
ized

the meeting

because

It was

as

Mr. Mayhew

appraisal (R133).

Mr. Brown character-

somewhat more difficult

was

not satisfied

by

that others

the performance

Mr. Schrock characterized the meeting as

"just not finished" and "somewhat difficult." (R155).
Mr. Mayhew had an accident involving a head injury in
September, 1985 (R109, 239) resulting in treatment for headaches.
ring

In January, 1986, Mr. Mayhew was treated for "recur-

headaches"

(R109,239), pain mediation

in April, 1986

(R239), November 17, 1986 "severe headaches" requiring ice
packs.
neck

Mr. Mayhew
disease

in

has been diagnosed
April

1988

(R246),

as having cervical
degenerative

joint

disease of cervical spine in April 1987 (R247), occipital
headaches,
headache

severe

January

headaches
10,

1986

September 11, 1985 (R256).
secondary

to

April

3, 1987

(R255),

(R252), recent

cervical

neck

strain

July, 1988 chronic cervical pain

degenerative

(R266).
-8-

joint

disease

which

is

mild

Mr. Mayhew has been unable to work

since March 13,

1987. (R9)
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ hereafter) summarized
in general the factual background prior to the incident of
March

12,

1987

indicating

that

the

onset

of

"stress

headaches" began as early as his transfer to Clearfield from
the

Bacchus

perceived

Works.

or

Scattered

imagined

and/or discrimination.

through

instances

of

the

testimony

employer

was

harassment

Mr. Mayhew testified that he was a

crusader for what was right and that the muscles in the back
of his neck will tighten up with stress.
Both

the

ALJ

and

(R28,49).

Respondent's counsel made

it very

clear to Mr. Mayhew and his then counsel that the claim was
based upon a specific event - namely the meeting of March
12, 1987 - and not an occupational disease claim based upon
a

theory

of

continued

instances

of

purported

stress

eventually resulting in the meeting of March 12, 1987 and
the supposed breakdown.
The

ALJ

allowed

Mr.

Mayhew

and

his

counsel

wide

latitude on his employment background but made it cl-ear to
all

that

we

were

occurrence.

No

occupational

disease

concerned

claim

was

under

with

ever
the

the

made
Utah

March

that

12,

this

Occupational

was

1987
an

Disease

Disability Act, Section 35-2-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated
(1953).
-9-

The ALJ found specifically:
"Since the applicant is contending that he has
sustained a compensable industrial accident on or
about March 12, 1987, it is necessary to apply
the test of an industrial accident set forth by
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Allen v.
Industrial Commission
729 P. 2d (Utah 1986),
Allen requires that the injury occurred "by
accident" and that there is a causal connection
between the alleged accident and the activities
or exertions required in the workplace.
The
first test which must be satisfied is the legal
causation
test.
That test for those with
pre-existing conditions requires that the employment must contribute something substantial to
increase the risk the Applicant already encountered in everyday life because of his condition."
Previously

recited

is

a

history

of

headaches

and

emotional problems dating back as far as two years prior to
the incident of March 12, 1987.

The record also discloses

numerous diagnoses of "headaches," "cervical disc- disease,"
"non industrial whip lash type" injuries.
extensive

history

of headache problems

Because of the

the

administrative

law judge held the applicant to the higher standard of the
Allen

decision

(supra).

This

requires

the

applicant

to

show something unusual or extraordinary about the incident
of March 12, 1987.
The ALJ in addressing this point found:
"I have gleaned no evidence of any unusual
activity or exertion which may have occurred in
that meeting.
The record is devoid of any
evidence that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was
the stressful event that the Applicant would have
the Administrative Law Judge believe." (R320)
-10-

The ALJ after a review of all the records f results of
the hearing including a Social Security disability benefits
award the following was found:

"After reviewing the findings of the Social
Security Administration and the other medical
reports on file, it would appear to the Administrative Law Judge that much of the activity at
Hercules, which the applicant was concerned
about, was of no significance. In light of the
applicant's medical problems, it can be explained
as the product of a paranoid personality which
Dr. Abdullah has found that the applicant suffers
from.
Once that diagnosis is brought to the
fore, the conspiracy theories and other theories
propounded by the applicant make some semblance
of sense.
However, the medical evidence does
not show any causal connection between the
applicant's meeting of March 12, 1987 and the
severe
headache
he started complaining of.
(R320) (Underscoring added.)
The

Industrial

Commission

upon

review

of

the

total

claim - which included numerous documents of what was in the
record as well as many documents not of record but reviewed
by the Commission to give applicant all possible benefit of
all available claims concluded:
"The Commission finds that the only issue on
review is whether the Administrative Law Judge
correctly denied benefits in this case.
The
Commission adopts the Administrative Law Judge's
Findings of Fact as stated in the October 21,
1988 Order.
The Commission agrees with the
Administrative Law Judge that medical and legal
causation
have
not
been established.
With
respect to medical cause, the medical records
submitted, in general, do not specify a medical
opinion regarding what was causing the headaches.
Most of the reports or records just state what
the applicant felt was causing the headaches. At
-11-

least one doctor did specify some concerns with
respect to functional overlay.
Therefore, a
causal connection between the work problems is
not clearly established by the medical records.
With respect to legal causation, the Commission
agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the
higher unusual exertion requirement is applicable
due to the applicant's history of headaches prior
to the 1987 work conflict. Although it is difficult to discern what mental stress the 20th century individual must face in everyday non-employment Life, the Commission finds that the stress
caused by disagreement with a superior's performance review cannot be considered unusual in
intensity when compared with everyday family,
financial
or
other
non-employment
stresses.
Because the Commission finds that neither legal
nor medical cause are established, the Commission
must affirm the Administrative Law Judge and deny
the Motion for Review.
(R444) (Underscoring
added)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

I.
THIS COURT HAS A LIMITED SCOPE OF REVIEW AND
MUST SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION.
The gravamen
following issue:

of this case narrows down to the

Was there substantial evidence to support

the decision of the Industrial Commission's denying workers
compensation benefits to Mr. Mayhew?
This standards for review by the Court of Appeals
is limited to a "correction of error" standard and need not
rely upon the expertise of the Industrial Commission in the
interpretation
enactments.

and application of statutes and legislative

The Industrial Commission's action in this case

were neither arbitrary or capricious but were based upon a
-12-

total

review

of

the

record

disclosing

a

total

lack

of

evidence to support an award.
II.
WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH
12, 1987 WAS NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH LEGAL AND MEDICAL TO THE HEADACHES AND RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY.
The

argument

in

Point

II

is

that

the

Industrial

Commission

in applying the decision in Allen v. Industrial

Commission

(supra) found that Mr. Mayhew failed to produce

any evidence of (1) legal causation and (2) medical causation as a result of the incident of March 12, 1987.
(1)

Because

Mr. Mayhew

had

previous

problems

with

headaches and emotional concernsf he was required to show
that

the

exceeded
typically

stress
the

or

exertion

exertion

undertakes

or
in

involved

stress

in

his

accident

that the average person

non-employment

life.

While

Mr.

Mayhew characterized the stressful nature of the meeting his
testimony

which

was

corroborated

by

the

employers

representatives present did not appear to be so.
(2)

The

medical

causation

connection

between

the

meeting of March 12, 1987 was only supported by what Mr.
Mayhew told his doctors and not by an independent evaluation
or suggestion that a direct medical relationship did exist.
III. THE ADEQUACY OF MR. MAYHEW1S BRIEF, FAILURE TO SUPPLY
TIMELY COPIES OF ALL PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO
BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE
IRREGULAR AND IMPROPER DESIGNATION OF PARTIES.
-13-

As spelled out in the section dealing with the "Course
of Proceedings

- Disposition Below", Respondent has care-

fully enumerated the failures and inadequacies of notice and
appraisal

of what was occurring

in this matter.

All the

shortcomings occurred after the discharge by Mr, Mayhew of a
very

able

and

Gale Lemmon.

skilled

workers compensation

attorney, Mr.

I am informed and therefore believe that the

discharge occurred

because Mr. Lemmon

inappropriate and refused to appeal.

felt

an appeal was

All time periods were

met by Mr. Mayhew but no opportunity given to Respondents to
answer on any portion of the appeal process until May, 1989.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS A
LIMITED SCOPE OF REVIEW AND MUST
SURVEY THE EVIDENCE IN THE LIGHT
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE FINDINGS AND ORDER
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

The scope of appellate review in Industrial Commission
matters has been described and interpreted many times by the
Court of Appeals

and the Supreme Court.

The most recent

decision on this subject is the very recent case of Olympus
Oil

Inc., the Workers Compensation

Fund of Utah and the

Employers Reinsurance Fund v. Stanley Lou Harrison, and the
Industrial Commission of Utah, 115 Utah Adv. Rep. 26.
Court of Appeals said in part:
At
the
outset, we
note
that
issues
involving the interpretation of legislative acts
and the statutory boundaries of the Commission's
power and authority involve questions of law.
-14-

The

Utah Dept. of Admin. Services v. Public Service
Commission, 68 P.2d 601, 608 (Utah, 1983).
Resolution of the issues in this case is not
benefitted
by the Commission's expertise or
experience.
See, e.g., Bennett v. Industrial
Commission
726 P.2d
427
(Utah 1986).
The
Commission has no expertise or experience in
determining whether the worker is an "employee"
within the meaning of the workers compensation
law.
We
thus
apply
a
correction-of-error
standard with no deference given to the expertise
of the Commission.
State Tax Commission v.
Industrial Commission 685 P.2d 1051, 1052 (Utah
1984).
(This standard
applied
in lieu of
standard set forth in the UAPA, Utah Code
Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii)(1988)).
In Richard Barry Hurley et. al., v. Board of Review of
the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of Employment
Security, Utah Adv. Report 20 (Utah 12/12/1988) the Supreme
Court in reviewing this self same issue stated in part:
"The
correction-of-error
standard
of
judicial review applies to agency decisions
involving
statutory
interpretations which an
appellate court is as well suited to decide as
the
agency.
In
Bennett
v..
Industrial
Commission 726 P.2d 427,429 (Utah 1986) the
Court stated:
We do not defer to the Commission
when construing statutory terms or
when applying statutory terms to
the facts unless the construction
of the statutory language or the
application of the law to the facts
should
be
subject
to
the
Commission's expertise gleaned from
its accumulated practical, first
hand experience with the subject
matter.
The correction-of-error standard also applies
when the issue is one of basic legislative
intent.

-15-

Thus, that standard also governs the construction
of
ordinary
statutory
terms.
See,
e*g.
Bennett, 726 P. 2d at 429 (coverage of workers
compensation statute to subcontractors employee;
Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 p, 2d
779, 782 (Utah 1984) (applicable limitations
period under workers compensation." ...
It

is

also

fundamental

in

Utah

that

the Court

of

Appeals will not review or weight the probative effect of
conflicting

evidence

before

the

Commission.

Wiseman

v.

Village Partners 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v.
Industrial Commission 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977).
The Court of Appeals must also survey the evidence in
the

light

Chadwick

most

v»

favorable

Industrial

to

the

Commission

Commission's
57 2

P.2d

findings.

400, Duaine

Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission, 29 Utah 2.d
478 (1973) .

and

As shown below, the

Industrial Commission's

actions

arbitrary

were neither

findings

nor capricious.

Such

findings were based upon the totality of the evidence or the
lack

thereof, on behalf

of Mr. Mayhew and should

not be

disturbed on appeal.
POINT II.

(A)

WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 12, 1987 WAS
NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH (A) LEGAL AND
(B) MEDICAL - TO THE HEADACHES AND
RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY.

Legal Causation
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act

provides in part.
"Every employee .. . who is injured ... by
accident arising out of or in the course of his

Thus, that standard also governs the construction
of
ordinary
statutory
terms.
See,
e.g.
Bennett, 726 P. 2d at 429 (coverage of workers
compensation statute to subcontractors employee;
Dean Evans Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P. 2d
779, 782 (Utah 1984) (applicable limitations
period under workers compensation." ...
It

is

also

fundamental

in Utah

that

the Court

of

Appeals will not review or weight the probative effect of
conflicting

evidence

before

the

Commission.

Wiseman

v.

Village Partners 589 P.2d 754, 755 (Utah 1978); dinger v.
Industrial Commission 571 P.2d 1328, 1329 (Utah 1977).
The Court of Appeals must also survey the evidence in
the

light

Chadwick

most

v.

favorable

Industrial

to

the

Commission

Commission's
572

P.2d

findings.

400, Duaine

Brown Chevrolet Co. v. Industrial Commission.
As shown below, the Industrial Commission's
and

actions

were neither

arbitrary

findings

nor capricious.

Such

findings were based upon the totality of the evidence or the
lack

thereof, on behalf

of Mr. Mayhew and should not be

disturbed on appeal.
POINT II.

(A)

WHETHER THERE IS EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
THAT THE INCIDENT OF MARCH 12, 1987 WAS
NOT CAUSALLY RELATED - BOTH (A) LEGAL AND
(B) MEDICAL - TO THE HEADACHES AND
RESULTANT TOTAL DISABILITY.

Legal Causation
Section 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act

provides in part.
"Every employee ... who is injured ... by
accident arising out of or in the course of his
-16-

employment ... shall be paid compensation
loss sustained on account of the injury •.•"

for

In Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729 P. 2d L5 (Utah
1986) , the Supreme Court said of Section 35-1-45:
This statute creates two prerequisites for a
finding of a compensable injury.
First, the
injury must be "by accident."
Second, the
language "arising out of or in the court of
employment" requires that there be a causal
connection
between
the
injury
and
the
employment. 729 P.2d at 18 (emphasis added)
The two prequisites are separate and distinct.
and

the Commission

The ALJ

did in fact treat them separately and

made specific findings on each.
Accident, under

Allen, supra, is established when it

is shown that an unintended, unexpected occurrence that may
be either the cause or the result of an injury that took
place.

729 P. 2d at

22.

Given

Mr. Mayhew's pre-existing

condition and the fact that he had been treated

for this

self same condition over a period of several months would
lead

to

the

result

which

occurred

on

March

12,

1987

regardless of any other circumstances.
It is apparent

that both the ALJ and the Commission

found that the legal cause had not been met.
"After

reviewing

Administrtion

and

would

to

appear

the
the
the

findings
other
ALJ

medical

that
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of

much

the

The ALJ stated

Social

reports
of

the

on

Security
file, it

activity

at

which

the

applicant

was

concerned

about

was

of

no

significance ..." (R320)
The Industrial Commission in keeping with the findings
of the ALJ by determining: "With respect to legal causation,
the Commission agrees with the ALJ that the higher unusual
exertion

requirement

is applicable due to the applicant's

history of headaches prior to the 1987 work conflict ... the
Commission
with

a

unusual

finds

that

the

stress

caused

by

disagreement

superiors performance review cannot be considered
in

financial

intensity when compared with
or

other

non-employment

everyday

family,

stresses."

(R444)

(Underscoring added)
The

burden

Appellant.

of

proving

legal

causation

was

on

the

In Allen (supra) the Court stated:

"Since the claimant had previous back problems to
meet

the

show that

legal

causation

requirement

[his exertion] exceeded

he

must

the exertion

that the average person typically undertakes in
n on-employment

life"

729

P. 2d

at

28

(Underscoring added)
Appellant failed in this regard by limiting himself to
the incident of March 12, 1987.

The ALJ characterized that

meeting

is devoid of any evidence

by stating

"The record

that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was the stressful event
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the Applicant would have the ALJ believe." (R320)
The only case found by Respondent involving a pure and
unusual stress claim of one specific occurrence was United
States Steel Corp. v. Draper, 613 P.2d

508

(Utah

1980).

The facts involved a fellow employee rushing to the scene of
a particularly

horrifying

fellow employee.

industrial

accident

involving

a

The Supreme Court said:

"The conduct of the employee running to investigate and to offer help when it appeared that a
fellow employee might be in critical danger or
distress was a natural and reasonably expectable
reaction so that his subsequent death from a
heart attack was an accident arising out of his
employment.
The fact that the deceased had a
pre-existing heart condition did not preclude
finding that his death resulted from an accident
in the course of his employment."
This

case, although decided

six years before Allen,

was in fact the precursor of that decision in holding that
in the presence of pre-existing conditions a significant,
highly

stressful

and

not activity of a normal type could

result in a compensable accident.
In Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial Commission
91 Utah Advanced Report 11, (Utah 1988) the Court of Appeals
found compensability for a fatal heart attack that resulted
from an extremely stressful work period.

The facts concern

a truck driver whose truck was 6-1/2 hours late to depart to
Denver.

The driver left without sleep the previous night,
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drove

through

hours.

snow

and

slippery

roads

to Denver

for 12

After five sleepless hours in Denver, on his return

to Salt Lake within 30 minutes of Denverf driver went off
the road and was found dead of heart failure.

The driver

had no history of heart disorder. This court said:
"Given this determination, Steward's employment
activity need only have involved usual or ordinary
exertion.
See
Price
River
Coal
v.
Industrial Commission , 731 P.2d at 1082 n.l;
Allen, 729 P. 2d at 26. Steward's heart attack
occurred while he was driving a truck for his
employer, an exertion connected with his usual
employment duty. Thus, the legal causation prong
is satisfied.
Furthermore, even if Steward did suffer
pre-existing risk factors sufficient to invoke
the higher "unusual or extraordinary exertion"
threshold, as the Fund argues, we are convinced
Steward satisfied standard."
The ALJ found that Steward was subject to
the following work related stress factors:
(1)
Anxiety caused by the late
arrival of his truck delaying his
departure from Salt Lake City, (2)
fatigue from having to drive on
slippery roads and during a snow
storm, both to and from Denver, (3)
fatigue from inadequate rest prior
to his departure from Denver and
(4) the use of amphetamines, probably in greater amounts than usual
because of the lack of rest.
Under the applicable standards of review,
see Lancaster 739 P. 2d at 238, we find there is
competent evidence before the Administrative Law
Judge to support his finding that Steward's
employment stress and exertion was both the legal
and medical cause of his fatal heart attack.
Contrast

the

foregoing

cases of work

related

stress

both resulting in death and both having stress factors far
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in excess of what is found in normal family and employment
life with the instant case.

The only basis for a claim by

Appellant was a meeting called to discuss routine personnel
matters that purportedly caused a headache in the Appellant.
It

is

respectfully

submitted

that

the

headache

had

no

relationship to the meeting.
B.

Medical Causation
The issue of medical causation becomes virtually

moot since the Appellant has failed on the legal causation.
A review of the record reveals a long history of headaches
dating back over 1-1/2 years.

Thus a pre-existing condition

exists and Appellant is now held to the higher standard of
"unusual or extraordinary" stress or strain.

This is fully

covered above.
All of the medical

reports

are self

serving

in the

sense that the doctor repeats what the Appellant has told*
him regarding the source of his complaint.

The Appellant

and his wife are the only ones who refer his headaches to
work related causes.
Only the Appellant advised of the nature of the work as
being stressful.

The other witnesses simply do not

corro-

borate the relationship of any job activity and the headaches suffered by the appellant.
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One can only assume that the headaches simply developed
on the job.

However, no medical relationship has been esta-

blished that work activities produced the headache.
It must be here remembered that Appellant has charged
Respondent only with the development of the headaches.
review

of

the

Social

Security

Disability

A

Determination

reveals extensive psychiatric problems wholly unrelated to
headaches that result in his being totally disabled. (R310)
The headaches are not considered a part of this.
Again, under
is

on

the

the Allen

Respondent

to

(supra) decision, the burden
show

medical

causation.

The

opinion, placing and describing the burden, states:
"Under the medical cause test, the claimant must
show by evidence, opinion, or otherwise that the
stres, strain, or exertion required by his or her
occupation led to the resulting injury or disability.
In the event the claimant cannot show a
medical causal connection, compensation should be
denied."
It is respectfully

submitted that the Respondent has

failed to meet this burden and establish medical causation
in addition to failing to meet the legal causation test.
POINT III.

THE INADEQUACY OF MR. MAYHEW'S BRIEF
FAILURE TO SUPPLY TIMELY COPIES OF
ALL PLEADINGS AND DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED
TO BOTH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE IRREGULAR AND IMPROPER DESIGNATION OF
PARTIES.

Respondents counsel after 40 years of practice is being
confronted with an appeal by an Appellant acting as his own
-22-

counsel.

In trial proceedings and in particular in adminis-

trative proceedings, this counsel has gone to great lengths
to see the other side is represented.

This was particularly

true when I was an ALJ with the Industrial Commission.

Had

I been aware of this appeal being taken without counsel, I
would have attempted to find someone to advise Mr. Mayhew.
The purpose of the above statement
Appeals
myself

is to assure this court
as counsel do not want

advantage

of

these

situations.

to the Court of

that Hercules, Inc. and

anyone to believe we take
The reverse

is true, we

expect all our employees to have full benefit of whatever
rights they may have.
As spelled out in the section dealing with the "Course
of Proceedings - Disposition Below", Respondent has carefully enumerated the instances of failure to give this Respondent notices of steps taken before the Commission, copies of
purported new evidence and the course of the appeal.
dents

counsel

had

in

fact

closed

his

file

and

Responbilled

Hercules for his services.
When

notified

of the preparation

of

the transcript,

Respondent was aware that an appeal had been perfected.
basis for the appeal was totally unknown.

A transcript was

ordered in partial preparation for defending the appeal.
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The

The substance of the Appeal was not known until August
7, 1989 when the Appellant served his copies of his brief
consisting of 30 pages of the brief and 25 separate addendums totaling close to 60 or so separate pages.
Beginning with the "Statement of the Case" Respondent
is unable to determine what Appellant believes the purpose
of his being before this Court.

This section is in sub-

stance a continuing argument with all his grievances with
his employer.
Just prior to the brief portion a reference is made to
the Jurisdiction of High Court of Appeals and quotes Section
7-2-2-(3)(a) which concerns the Supreme Court and not the
Court of Appeals.
With regard to the "Nature of Proceeding" this recites
nothing more than Respondents dissatisfaction with the conduct

of

occasioned

the
by

hearing.

Complaining

about

objections

from Respondent

well as objections by his own counsel.

interruptions

to questions as

Respondent alleges

he was in pain and couldn't remember datesf events (etc.).
Respondent had no difficulty in remembering with some detail
purported acts of conspiracy (etc.).
"Issues and Detail of the Case" a restatement
denial

of

opportunity

to be

heard,

regarding the content of the record.

incorrect

of a

statements

Reference is made to

several memos involving transfers, attempted layoffs, all of
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which

concerned

actions

and

proceedings

prior

to March,

1987.
"Medical Causation" consisted of 10 pages of complaints
on the severity of his pain, the production of which related
to his inability to function.
lant agrees

In the course of this, Appel-

that he has totally disabiling

arthritis and

such was found by SSI.
In

the

Electric

discussions, Appellant

case

of

1928

dealing

refers

with

to the Graybar

a hernia.

Appellant

refers to the Pintar case which deals with partial impairments .
In the section

entitled

"Disposition at Trial Court"

Appellant correctly states what took palce at the administrative level and how the case eventually ended in the Court of
Appeals.
The next section

is totally baffling by name.

entitled "Legal Caucasion."

It is

I am unfamiliar with Appellants

intention in this section since he refers initially to Section 35-1-45 of the Workers Compensation Act describing accident.

However, the next referenced section of the code is

Section
Division

34-35-6
of

which

deals

with

the

the Industrial Commission.

Anti-Discrimination
The division

has

nothing to do with industrial accidents.
"Summary of the Argument" amounts to a restatement of
arguments earlier made as outlined above.
-25-

"Conclusions and Relief Sought" deals with the subject
of Appellants disadvantage of not having counsel and the
refusal

of

the

Court

of

Appeals

to

appoint

counsel.

Appellant argues that his case was improperly presented by
his counsel.

As a matter of fact, the reverse is true. Mr.

Lemmon wrung out of this hearing all possible evidence favorable to Appellant.

Appellant was desirous of attempting to

get into the record matters wholly irrelevant and immaterial
and would be of no help in his receiving a favorable decision.

Appellant finally recites benefits he believes he is

entitled to under Section 34-35-6 dealing with unfair employment practices.

Such matters are totally out of the sphere

of workers compensation.
I
1-25.

reviewed
All

in detail the submitted addendum numbered

of the addenda

are already

in the record on

appeal dealing with any aspect of the comepnsation claim.
Several deal with the EEOC and the Anti-Discrimination Division.

Some

of

these

are in the file but none have ny

application or relevancy to workers compensation.
Respondent

has heretofore

referred

in this brief the

shortcomings both as to notices and copies of the proceedings.

Such

failures

increased

the difficulties

in

even

writing this brief.
The only
Appellant's

insight

brief

is

I can gain
that

he was

-26-

from a total review of
dissatisfied

with

the

treatment he received by Hercules.

Respondent insists that

Hercules has been a good and understanding employer to this
man.

Hercules has continued to receive claims of mistreat-

ment , harrassment, bad faith

(etc.) by the Respondent but

has never responded in kind.

Respondent has never termin-

ated Appellant.
from

the

physical

Appellant is drawing long term disability

insurance carrier
examination

for Hercules.

Appellant

could

be

Upon passing a
rehired

although

Social Security Disability indicating total disability would
prevent his return.
CONCLUSION
In order for an industrial injury to be compensable, it
must

meet

supra.

the

dual

causation

test

A decision of the Commission

set

forth

in

Alien,

in denying the exis-

tence of either medical causation or legal causation justifies

the

Court

of

Appeals

in

affirming

the

Industrial

Commission's decision denying Appellant workers compensation
benefits as a result of the incident of March 12, 1987.
DATED this

day of September, 1989.

/

^

.//

ROBERT J. SHAUGHNESSY
Attorney for Respondent
Hercules, Inc.
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ADDENDUM N O .

1

35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents to be paid.
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is injured and the dependents of each such employee who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was
not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsibility for compensation and
payment of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and funeral
expenses provided under this chapter shall be on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the employee.

ADDENDUM NO.

2

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case Mo:

B88000609
*

NORMAN J. MAYHEW,

*
*

Applicant,

*
*

vs.
HERCULES, INC. and/or
CIGNA,
Defendants.

*

FINDINGS OF FACT

*
*

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room #332, Utah Industrial Commission, 160 East 300
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on October 14, 1988 at 8:30
o'clock a.m. Said hearing was pursuant to order and notice
of the Industrial Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

The Applicant was present
Lemmon, Attorney at Law.

and

represented

by

M.

Gale

The Defendants were represented by Robert J. Shaughnessy,
Attorney at Law.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the defendants, by and
through counsel, made a Motion to Dismiss the Application for Hearing on the
grounds that the applicant had failed to sustain his burden of proof proving
that he sustained a compensable industrial accident on or about March 12,
1987. Being fully advised in the premises, the Administrative Law Judge is
prepared to enter the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT:

The applicant herein, Norman J. Mayhew was a quality control engineer
employed by Hercules at their Clearfield plant. The applicant testified that
his job was to implement inspection points within the assembly procedure at
Hercules. The applicant started working at Hercules in February 1966, and was
layed off in 1976 which lasted until 1981. The applicant then returned to
work at Hercules and before being transferred to Clearfield in 1985 the
applicant was a Records Retention Clerk at the Bacchus Works.
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The applicant testified that once he transferred to the Clearfield
plant, he started experiencing stress headaches and related that one of the
past superintendents was very abusive. The applicant testified that they were
constantly getting orders to change the paper work on the floor, and that it
was "all a conspiracy" because he suggested a change, which was rejected. The
applicant testified that he was feeling threatened, and was starting to get
irritable, and was starting to have headaches. The applicant testified that
things were going on behind his back, and that he was unable to secure any
overtime work, although two other similarly situated employees were given
overtime. The applicant testified that he had a company physical in January
of 1986 and at that time was complaining of serious headaches.
The
applicant's testimony was replete with examples of perceived employer
harassment of him. The applicant testified that he is a crusader for what is
right, and that the muscles in the back of his neck will tighten up from
stress. The applicant denied any prior neck or head pain before March of
1987, and denied any prior headaches.
The basis of the applicants workers compensation claim, concerns a
staff meeting which occurred on March 12, 1987. By way of background, the
applicant was given a copy of his personnel appraisal review form in early
March of 1987 by his supervisor.
In that evaluation, the applicant was
informed that he would need improvement in the area of communicating the
technical information required as part of his job, and that his overall rating
was competent. The applicant took issue with his evaluation, and took it upon
himself to publish a Memo for distribution to some of the Hercules* employees
asking them to list his good points and bad points. The applicant was
"written-up" for this violation of company rules, and was found to be guilty
of misappropriation of company resources for a personal project, and
disruptive behavior within the workplace.
Because of the applicant's
dissatisfaction with his job evaluation, a meeting was arranged between the
applicant's immediate supervisor, the applicant, the Personnel Manager, and
the Quality Control Manager. That meeting was scheduled for March 12, 1987.
At
the meeting, the applicant's communication
deficits were
discussed, as was his overall rating. It should be noted that the applicant's
job was not in jeopardy as the result of the performance evaluation. Rather,
the meeting was called in an effort to satisfy the applicant. It should
further be noted that the evaluation the applicant received in March of 1987
was actually better than any of his prior evaluations since he had transferred
to the Clearfield plant. Once at the meeting, the parties discussed the
applicant's review, and according to two of the participants at the meeting,
who testified, the applicant was gaining ground with respect to getting his
point across, when all of a sudden the applicant threw up his arms and
muttered something to the effect "what's the use" and then stormed out of the
meeting without any further communication.
The following morning the applicant called into work and informed his
immediate supervisor that he had a stress headache and would be reporting to

NORMAN J. MAYHEW
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS & ORDER
PAGE THREE

the company clinic.
The applicant reported to the company clinic, and
complained of a headache, for which he received an ice pack for his forehead.
The applicant was then seen later that day at the Ogden Clinic. On March 19th
the applicant called in to his supervisor and complained of neck pain but no
headaches. Eventually the meeting was reconvened on March 23, 1987, and at
that time the applicant presented his own list of what he felt were
requirements for an outstanding evaluation.
The applicant's immediate
supervisors rejected his proposals, and again tried to resolve the differences
concerning the applicant's evaluation report. The applicant was requested to
sign the evaluation as well as the incident report, to which he responded he
would have to make an off plant phone call before he could sign those
documents. The applicant left the meeting, which was a calm meeting, and
there was no other communication with the applicant concerning his evaluation
report or the incident report. At both meetings, the applicant did not appear
to be in pain, according to two of the participants at that meeting, and with
respect to the first meeting, that meeting has been described as being less
strident than other personnel evaluation reviews.
The applicant has been unable to work since March 13, 1987 and on
July 26, 1988 was found to be permanently disabled by the Social Security
Administration, as the result of severe degenerative disc disease of the
cervical spine and a depression disorder.
Since the applicant is contending that he has sustained a compensable
industrial accident on or about March 12, 1987, it is necessary to apply the
test of an industrial accident set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in the case
of Allen v Industrial Commission 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). Allen requires that
proof that the injury occurred "by accident" and that there is a causal
connection between the alleged accident and the activities or exertions
required in the workplace. The first test which must be satisfied is the
legal causation test.
That test for those with pre-existing conditions
requires that the employment must contribute something substantial to increase
the risk the applicant already encountered in everyday life because of his
condition.
In this case, the evidence is rife with instances of prior
headache complaints of the applicant. The applicant attempted to minimize his
prior headache complaints on both direct and cross examination. The applicant
also initially denied any head trauma or injuries or neck injuries
whatsoever. Upon further probing, it was revealed that the applicant had
sustained an accident on or about September 9, 1985 while playing football
with his children. According to the office notes of Dr. Feyereisn dated
September 11, 1985 the applicant fell down and hit his head on the ground and
started complaining of neck and headaches thereafter. The applicant was given
600 milligram Ibuprofen, and was diagnosed as having a whiplash type cervical
strain. I should note that the applicant initially received medical treatment
from the company clinic on September 10, 1985 when he was given Tylenol for a
headache. The company's medical records indicate that the applicant came in
complaining of a headache on July 16, 1985 and was given Tylenol at that
time. The applicant was then seen by Dr. Feyereisn at the Ogden Clinic on
September 11, 1985.
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The applicant returned to the company clinic on September 16, 1985
and the personnel there noted that the applicant was suffering from a
non-industrial post-head injury, and that he was complaining of severe
headaches and neck pains. The applicant was given more analgesic by the
company clinic. That same day the applicant returned to the Ogden Clinic and
received Naprosyn from Dr. Feyereisn, and was complaining of light headedness
and some blurring of his vision. The applicant continued working, but
continued to have problems with headaches. He reported to the company on
January 16, 1986 of illness, but declined medication and requested that he be
allowed to have a physical. However, that same day the applicant reported to
the Ogden Clinic complaining of recurrent headaches on the left top of his
head. On January 21, 1986 the applicant received his annual examination from
Dr. Isakson. Apparently, the applicant was placed on a diet by the Clinic.
The applicant was given a refill for Tylenol on April 2, 1986 by the company
clinic.
The applicant's
next medical
treatment
for headaches
occurred
on
November 27, 1986 when he reported to the company clinic complaining of a
severe headache. The applicant was treated with bed rest and a cold pack on
his forehead for one half four. The applicant next had treatment on March 12,
1987 when he was seen by Dr. Blanche complaining of a headache. On March 13,
1987, the applicant was seen at the Clinic early that morning complaining of
headache. The applicant requested permission to lie down and also requested
an ice pack, which was the same treatment he received on November 17, 1986.
Later that day as previously indicated the applicant reported to the Ogden
Clinic. On April 3, 1987 the applicant was seen by Dr. Blanche for complaints
of severe headaches.
Dr. Blanche took a history that indicated that he
••states about a year ago on his job he got under stress and upset and
developed a severe occipital headache that took a month to six weeks to
subside." The doctor goes on to indicate that the applicant got along fairly
well until about March 13, 1988 when ••something happened to him and so far
feels he hasn't been able to obtain relief with ice packs, pills, etc.." The
applicant told Dr. Blanche that he had been harassed ever since moving to
Hercules and that since he had become 50 years of age that the company wanted
to get rid of him. The doctor noted that the applicant would not go into the
particulars as to what the stress might have been. Dr. Blanche concluded that
the applicant was suffering from anxiety and tension with depression, and that
he should probably should be prescribed an antidepressant.
From the foregoing, it should be clear to the reader that the
applicant has had a history of complaints of severe headaches. The headache
which the applicant had on March 13, 1987 is no different from the headache he
had on November 17, 1986. Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge concludes
that the higher legal causation standard of Allen applies in this case.
Accordingly, the applicant must show something unusual or extraordinary about
the work activities of March 12, 1987 which would justify the Administrative
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Law Judge making a finding that a compensable event occurred on that date.
From the applicant's testimony and from the testimony of the participants in
that meeting, I have gleaned no evidence of any unusual activity or exertion
which may have occurred in that meeting. The record is devoid of any evidence
that that meeting of March 12, 1987 was the stressful event that the applicant
would have the Administrative Law Judge believe. The applicant has contended
that the meeting of March 12, 1987 was for the purpose of laying him off.
Yet, nothing could be further from the truth. The evidence proffered at the
time of the hearing from the testimonial witnesses was that the applicant
would not have been fired as the result of his evaluation report, in fact the
report that the applicant was so upset about was actually an improvement over
his prior two personnel appraisal reports. Therefore, it strains credulity to
assume that the applicant would have thought that his job was on the line
because of an evaluation, when that evaluation was better than any prior
evaluation he had received while working at Clearfield. Further, the meeting
was basically called at the insistence of the applicant, owing to his refusal
to
sign
the personnel
evaluation
report.
It would appear to the
Administrative Law Judge that the defendants, in a spirit of working together,
attempted to resolve and address the applicant's concerns.
After reviewing the findings of the Social Security Administration,
and the other medical reports on file, it would appear to the Administrative
Law Judge that much of the activity at Hercules, which the applicant was
concerned about, was of no significance. In light of the applicant's medical
problems, it can be explained as the product of a paranoid personality, which
Dr. Abdullah has found that the applicant suffers from. Once that diagnosis
is brought to the fore, the conspiracy theories and other theories propounded
by the applicant make some semblance of sense. However, the medical evidence
does not show any causal connection between the applicant's meeting of March
12, 1987 and the severe headache he started complaining of. Rather, the file
clearly indicates that the applicant was complaining of severe headaches prior
to March 12 or March 13, 1987 and accordingly any headaches that he complained
of on March 12 or March 13, 1987 were not fundamentally different than the
prior complaints he had already had. In fact, the reader may recall that the
treatment the applicant received at the company clinic on March 13, 1987 was
exactly the same as the treatment he received on November 17, 1986. When the
applicant reported to the Clinic on March 13, 1987 he knew what treatment to
request, and he requested that treatment, namely permission to lie down for 30
minutes and an ice pack for his forehead.
Therefore, rather than to prolong this opinion with further
variances, suffice it to say the applicant has not met either his legal
causation burden or his medical causation burden in this case.
Put
differently, in good conscience, I can find no evidence of any unusual
activity or exertion which occurred on March 12 or March 13, 1987 while the
applicant was employed by Hercules, Inc.. Rather, I find that the applicant
had a long standing history of complaints of severe headaches, and that the
headache of March 13, 1987 was no different than prior headaches the applicant
had already been complaining of.
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COMCLUSIOMS OF LAW:

The applicant
has not
sustained his burden of proving by
preponderance of the evidence that he sustained a compensable industrial
accident on March 13, 1987, which accident arose out of or during the course
or scope of his employment with Hercules, Inc..

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the claim of Morman J. Mayhew alleging a
compensable industrial accident on or about March 12, 1987 while employed by
Hercules, Inc. should be, and the same is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to review or appeal.

Timothy C ./Allen
Administrative Law Judge

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
31**
day of October, 1988.
ATTEST:

AjLdJdbLf frit
?£~

Linda J.^Strasburg
Commission Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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1988, a copy of the attached
FIMDIMGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AMD ORDER in the case of NORMAN J. MAYHEW
was mailed to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Norman J. Mayhew
1806 Pleasant View Drive
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M. Gale Lemmon
Attorney at Law
311 South State, Suite 240
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2180 South 1300 East, Suite 417
Salt Lake City, UT 84106

/ft
Robert J. Shaughnessy
Attorney at Law
1800 South West Temple, Suite 407
Salt Lake City, UT 84115
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 88000609

NORMAN J. MAYHEW,
Applicant,

*
*

VS.

*

HERCULES, INC., and/or
CIGNA,

*
*

ORDER DENYING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

*

*

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On October 21 f 1988, an Administrative Law Judge of the Industrial
Commission issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order denying the
applicant in the above-captioned case workers compensation benefits associated
with the applicant's severe headaches, which the applicant claimed resulted
due to stress in the work place. In the Administrative Law Judge's Order, the
Administrative Law Judge noted that the applicant's medical history showed the
applicant first complaining of headaches in July of 1985. Per the records,
the headaches increased in severity after the applicant sustained a head
injury on September 9, 1985, at home playing football with his children. The
Administrative Law Judge also noted that the applicant reported to the
defendant/employer's medical clinic several times in 1986, due to severe
headaches. Then, in early 1987, the applicant experienced some conflict with
his superiors at work, which conflict involved his performance reviews.
Shortly thereafter, the applicant discontinued working due to severe headaches
on March 13, 1987.
In analyzing the applicant's headache condition to determine whether
it could be considered a compensable industrial injury, the Administrative Law
Judge stated that the applicant needed to show both medical and legal
causation. The Administrative Law Judge determined that the applicant could
not meet the legal causation test because that test required that the
applicant be injured pursuant to exertion greater than that experienced by
Twentieth
Century
individuals
in
normal
non-employment
life.
The
Administrative Law Judge explained that this requirement of unusual exertion
is applicable to the applicant's headache condition because the applicant had
a pre-existing headache problem prior to the date the stress in the workplace
was apparent.
The Administrative Law Judge concluded that this kind of
unusual exertion did not occur in the applicant's workplace. Also, the
Administrative Law Judge determined that the applicant could not establish
medical causation because the headaches appeared to be either the result of
the 1985 at-home head injury or the result of functional overlay (per the
medical records).
For lack of both legal and medical causation, the
Administrative Law Judge found that the applicant's headache condition was
noneompensable.
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On November 21 f 1988, pursuant to U. C. A. 35-1-82.53, the applicant
filed a pro se Motion for Review. The Motion for* Review is quite lengthy and
is comprised almost entirely of a word-for-word duplication of the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact. A number of exhibits are attached to the
Motion for Review which for the most part document the applicant's job
requirements, personnel actions, employer policies and Social Security
disability award.
In what the applicant referred to as the "Addendum," he
points out that he feels that the Administrative Law Judge used too stringent
of a standard in determining the compensability of his claim. This is the
only reason given by the applicant that the Commission can find which
specifies why the applicant objects to the Administrative Law Judge's Order.
The Commission finds that the only issue on review is whether the
Administrative Law Judge correctly denied benefits in this case.
The
Commission adopts the Administrative Law Judge's Findings of Fact as stated in
the October 21, 1988 Order. The Commission agrees with the Administrative Law
Judge that medical and legal causation have not been established.
With
respect to medical cause, the medical records submitted, in general, do not
specify a medical opinion regarding what was causing the headaches. Most of
the reports or records just state what the applicant felt was causing the
headaches. At least one doctor did specify some concerns with respect to
functional overlay. Therefore, a causal connection between the work problems
is not clearly established by the medical records. With respect to legal
causation, the Commission agrees with the Administrative Law Judge that the
higher unusual exertion requirement is applicable due to the applicant's
history of headaches prior to the 1987 work conflict. Although it is
difficult to discern what mental stresses the 20th Century individual must
face in everyday non-employment life, the Commission finds that the stress
caused by disagreement with a superior's performance review cannot be
considered unusual in intensity when compared with everyday family, financial
or other non-employment stresses. Because the Commission finds that neither
legal nor medical cause are established, the Commission must affirm the
Administrative Law Judge and deny the Motion for Review.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the applicant's November 21, 1988 Motion
for Review is denied and the Administrative Law Judge's October 21, 1988 Order
is hereby affirmed with appeal to the Court of Appeals within thirty (30) days
as specified in U. C. A. 63-46b-12 through U. C. A. 63-46b-14 and U. C. A.
35-1-86.
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fliomas R. Carlson
Commissioner
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
7&
day of March, 1989.
ATTES

'Linda J. S t ^ s o u r g
Commissiory/Secretary
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March /
, 1989, a copy of the attached
Order Denying Motion for Review, in the case of Norman M. Mayhew, was mailed
to the following persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

Norman J. Mayhew, 1806 Pleasant View Drive, Ogden, UT

84414

M. Gale Lemmon, Atty., 311 South State Street, Suite 240, SLC,
UT 84111
CIGNA, Attn: Colleen Richardson, 2180 South 1300 East, Suite
417, SLC, UT 84106
/Robert Shaughnessy, Atty., 1800 S. W. Temple, Suite 407, SLC, UT
84115
Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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Wilma Burrows

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that four true and correct
copies of the foregoina Brief of Respondent was mailed
postage pre-paid, this 7^ day of September, 1989.
Mr. Norman J. Mayhew
1806 West Pleasant View Drive
Ogden, Utah 84414

